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CULTURE, RELIGION, AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE
DAVID BOGEN* AND LESLIE F. GOLDSTEIN**
The Constitution treats culture, religion, and government as sep-
arate concepts.  Different clauses of the First Amendment protect cul-
ture and religion from government.  For several decades, the
Supreme Court of the United States interpreted the First Amendment
as offering religion greater protection against interference than was
offered to culture, but the Supreme Court largely dissolved these con-
stitutional differences when confronted with issues posed by the relig-
ious practices of Native Americans.  With some indigenous Americans,
the lines between culture, religion, and even government blur—chal-
lenging the Supreme Court’s assumptions about the Constitution.
The uniqueness of the claims of Native Americans pushed the Su-
preme Court toward recognition of a common constitutional standard
for religion and cultural protection, but also justified political exemp-
tions targeted at tribal behavior that do not extend to other religions
or cultures.
I. CULTURE
If culture is defined as “the integrated pattern of human knowl-
edge, belief, and behavior that depends upon man’s capacity for
learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations,”1 it
encompasses almost everything we do.  Culture includes both govern-
ment and religion because they are aspects of the ways in which a
group of humans live.  What makes it culture, however, is intergenera-
tional transmission, which requires some form of communication
from one generation to the next.2  Thus, the First Amendment’s guar-
antees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press protect culture
by protecting its transmission.  Statements of the beliefs and rituals of
a group are one form of transmission, but behavior also transmits ways
of living.  Actions often express the actor’s membership in the culture
Copyright  2009 by David Bogen and Leslie F. Goldstein.
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** Judge Hugh M. Morris Professor of Political Science, University of Delaware.
1. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 282 (10th ed. 1996).
2. For instance, an anthropology textbook defines “culture” as “a shared way of life
that includes values, beliefs, and norms transmitted within a particular society from genera-
tion to generation.” RAYMOND SCUPIN, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 43 (5th ed. 2003).
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and signal to others how to conform to the culture.  Despite its com-
municative aspect, Congress may regulate such conduct.
The Supreme Court developed the test for regulating expressive
behavior in relation to symbolic acts in the 1968 case of United States v.
O’Brien.3  The O’Brien test upholds regulation affecting communicative
acts if the regulation furthers an “important or substantial” govern-
mental interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression and
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is not
greater than what is necessary to further that interest.4  Laws targeted
at specific cultures will usually fail this test because the governmental
interest is not substantial or the restriction is unnecessary to further
the purported legitimate interest; however, generally applicable laws
normally remain valid.5
II. RELIGION
The essence of religion is belief rather than communication.  The
First Amendment protects religion by forbidding Congress from mak-
ing any law “respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof . . . .”6  Although many religious groups pros-
elytize, courts usually use freedom of speech analysis to judge the con-
stitutionality of regulation.7  The Free Exercise Clause comes into play
primarily when an individual’s beliefs conflict with behavioral require-
ments of government.
Five years before O’Brien, the Supreme Court stated in Sherbert v.
Verner8 that the government must have a “compelling state interest” to
coerce individuals to behave contrary to their religious beliefs.9  For
3. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
4. Id. at 377.
5. For a more in-depth discussion of this point, see generally David Bogen, Generally
Applicable Laws and the First Amendment, 26 SW. U. L. REV. 201 (1997).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. Jehovah’s Witnesses have been involved in many of the great speech cases. See, e.g.,
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 142 (1943) (finding a city ordinance that prohibited
door-to-door distribution of religious materials unconstitutional when the ordinance was
challenged by a Jehovah’s Witness who distributed religious literature to households);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 568, 574 (1942) (holding that state public
nuisance laws used to convict a Jehovah’s Witness distributing religious literature on the
streets were not invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment as unreasonable restraints on
the freedom of worship); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 591–92, 599–600
(1940) (declining to excuse Jehovah’s Witness schoolchildren from compelled participa-
tion in a school flag-salute ceremony).
8. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
9. Id. at 403 (citing and quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).  Sherbert broke with a lengthy line of cases that had endorsed
the principle that a neutral, secular law of general applicability that incidentally limited an
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nearly three decades thereafter, the Supreme Court preferred relig-
ion over other aspects of culture by using a different standard to de-
scribe the government interest necessary to regulate religious
behavior (“compelling state interest”) as opposed to other communi-
cative acts (“important or substantial” interest).10  Unemployment
compensation cases like Sherbert often resulted in discharged employ-
ees succeeding in obtaining payments by showing a religious motiva-
tion for the behavior for which they were discharged.11  The strongest
application of the compelling interest standard occurred in Wisconsin
v. Yoder,12 in which the Supreme Court held that Amish parents could
refuse to send their children to school after the eighth grade.13 Yoder
extended the Sherbert path considerably because it was the first to re-
quire a religiously based exemption from a criminal statute of general
applicability (truancy laws).
The inconsistency of using a different level of scrutiny for regula-
tions of religion and culture became apparent when the Supreme
aspect of someone’s religious practice (in a way that did not simultaneously implicate
speech or press) did not violate the Free Exercise Clause, and that the Clause did not
require a specific religious exemption for such practices. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599, 600–01, 609–10 (1961) (rejecting a free exercise challenge to Sunday closing laws);
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt. of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617, 630–31 (1961) (same);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 450–52 (1961) (same); Hamilton v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 262, 265 (1934) (holding that a college could require participa-
tion in military science and tactics courses as a condition of enrollment despite petitioners’
objections based upon religious beliefs); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161, 166
(1878) (upholding a statute criminalizing polygamy against a First Amendment challenge
by a twice-married member of the Mormon church who had been convicted under the
statute).
10. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 186 (1997)  (internal citations
omitted) (stating the general rule for intermediate scrutiny of content-neutral regulations
of speech).  If the regulation is not content-neutral, it will fail the prongs of the O’Brien
test, which require the governmental interest to be unrelated to the suppression of free
expression and that the restriction of expression be no greater than necessary to further
that legitimate interest. See supra text accompanying note 4. R
11. See Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 830–31, 834–35 (1988)
(finding that an individual denied unemployment benefits for refusing to work on Sunday
may raise a free exercise claim even if that individual is not a member of an established
religious group); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 138–39,
143–44, 146 (1987) (finding that an individual may not be denied unemployment benefits
for refusing to work on a holy day, consistent with the Sherbert standard, even if the individ-
ual converted to that religious belief after he or she was originally hired); Thomas v. Re-
view Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 709, 719–20 (1981) (applying Sherbert to the unemployment
compensation claim of a Jehovah’s Witness who was terminated for refusing to produce
war materials); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399–403, 410 (holding that a state may not deny with-
out showing a “compelling state interest” unemployment benefits to an individual dis-
charged for refusing to work on a holy day).
12. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
13. Id. at 207, 234–36.
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Court decided a group of cases involving Native Americans.14  In one
case after another, the Supreme Court refused to use the compelling
interest standard, culminating in the Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith15 decision written by Justice Scalia, who
claimed that the standard applied only to situations exactly like those
in Sherbert and Yoder.16
The first of the aforementioned Native American cases, Bowen v.
Roy,17 arose from a parent’s belief that if the Social Security Adminis-
tration were to use the Social Security number it had issued to Roy’s
two-year-old daughter for record-keeping regarding the distribution
of welfare benefits, the use of a Social Security number would rob her
of her spirit.18  Concerning the father’s desire to forbid the federal
government from using her number at all, eight Justices agreed that
free exercise does not entail a right to tell the United States govern-
ment how to manage its own records.19  After this point, the five re-
maining Justices from the original six-Justice majority of Yoder
disagreed on the remaining issues.  Chief Justice Burger, who had
written the Yoder opinion, wanted to apply ordinary rather than strict
scrutiny because this case involved a “requirement for the administra-
tion of welfare programs reaching many millions of people . . . .”20
Justice Blackmun wanted to remand before deciding the merits be-
14. In two of the request-for-religious-exemption cases involving groups other than Na-
tive Americans between 1972 and 1990, Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989),
and United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), the Supreme Court ruled that the government
had met the Sherbert/Yoder test.  Both cases involved federal taxes, and the Supreme Court
reasoned that the successful operation of a complex, nationwide tax scheme amounted to
an overriding interest for which it was “essential” that particularized religious objections
not be honored in order to assure comprehensive participation. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at
699–700; Lee, 455 U.S. at 258–60.  See also the post-Sherbert (pre-Yoder) case of Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), in which the Supreme Court upheld the government’s
refusal of conscientious objector status to religious objectors to particular wars (as distin-
guished from war per se) on the ground that the policy was “strictly justified by substantial
governmental interests” in doing what was “necessary” to “raise and support [an] arm[y].”
Id. at 439, 462.  Two other cases that rejected Sherbert/Yoder style requests for religious ex-
emptions emerged from contexts where security needs were exceptionally strong, and
therefore they constricted normal constitutional liberties.  These were Goldman v. Wein-
berger, 475 U.S. 503, 510 (1986), which involved the governmental interest of a need for
discipline within the military, and O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350–51 (1987),
which involved the governmental interest of a need for discipline within its prison system.
In other words, all of these cases, except for the two Native American ones, can be viewed
as having applied the Sherbert/Yoder test.
15. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
16. Id. at 881 & n.1, 883–84.
17. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
18. Id. at 695–96.
19. Id. at 699–700.
20. Id. at 707–08 (plurality opinion).
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cause he was not convinced that the federal government would insist
on having Roy re-supply the Social Security number every time he ob-
tained welfare benefits.21 He further reasoned that if all that is at stake
is the issuance of the number and issuance of the number is a fait
accompli, the case may be moot.22  He agreed, however, with Justices
O’Connor, Brennan, and Marshall that if the government were to in-
sist that this number be provided every month in order to get welfare
benefits, that practice would be unconstitutional under Sherbert and
Yoder.23  Justice White, in a one-sentence dissent, simply insisted that
the Sherbert test should control.24  The other holdovers from Yoder, Jus-
tice Brennan and Justice Marshall, aligned with Justice O’Connor in a
partial dissent and partial concurrence.  She believed that persons
who objected to supplying their Social Security numbers on the
ground that its use would rob them of their spirit were so rare that
allowing them an exemption from that duty would not seriously bur-
den the United States government.25
Justice Scalia’s claim that the Bowen Court did not apply the Sher-
bert/Yoder test is correct because the Supreme Court treated the issue
as being whether the federal government could issue a Social Security
number to a person against that person’s religious objection, and five
Justices (Burger, Rehnquist, Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens) appear
to have been willing to apply ordinary scrutiny for that issue.  Chief
Justice Burger, who had authored the Yoder opinion, was willing to
drop the test for this context, essentially on the ground that the need
for comprehensive fraud detection within the welfare system was more
like the tax setting of Hernandez v. Commissioner26 and United States v.
Lee27 than like the individualized hearing situations of unemployment
compensation or criminal prosecution.28  The Bowen majority was will-
21. Id. at 714–15 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 715–16.
24. Id. at 733 (White, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 728–29 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
26. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
27. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
28. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 709–10 (plurality opinion) (“No one can doubt that prevent-
ing fraud in these benefits programs is an important goal . . . [and] it is plain that the
Social Security number requirement is a reasonable means of promoting that goal.”). Jus-
tices Stevens and Blackmun did not announce a test for this issue but simply indicated that
how the government itself behaves in its internal administration (apart from the matter of
denying any benefits) is not a question that implicates the Free Exercise Clause. See id. at
713 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part) (concluding that the appellees’ argument that the
government’s actions must be justified by a compelling state interest “stretches the Free
Exercise Clause too far”); id. at 716–17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in
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ing to conclude that in settings like this, the reasonableness test made
more sense than strict scrutiny.
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n29 did not concern
alleged governmental robbing of an individual’s spirit, but rather in-
volved governmental actions within a National Forest that deprived
three Native American tribes of the opportunity for certain tribe
members to engage in obligatory meditation-style religious activities,
which they understood to benefit their entire tribe.30  Tribe members
had to perform these activities in this particular natural setting, and
that setting had to be peaceful, quiet, and unmarred by man-made
alterations.31  The Indian association had sought a court injunction
against the building of a logging road.32  During the litigation, Con-
gress outlawed timber-cutting throughout the contested area so as to
minimize disturbance to the Native Americans, but the Tribe wanted
to have the road itself blocked.33  Justice O’Connor wrote for the Ly-
ing Court and rejected the claim that this program would “prohibit”
the free exercise of religion to any significant degree.34  She insisted
that free exercise did not amount to a right to a religiously motivated
veto over a government program simply because the program made it
harder to practice one’s religion.35  Three of the four Yoder holdovers,
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, dissented on the grounds
that a government program rendering a particular religious practice
impossible to carry out did not substantially differ from a government
program forbidding the practice, and that the government had shown
no compelling reason for the road.36  Again, Justice Scalia’s claim that
the majority failed to apply the Sherbert test is correct.  It is conceivable
that Justice White, the other Yoder holdover, went with the majority
because he agreed with the claim that the Sherbert test is triggered only
when the government imposes some sort of coercive pressure against
religious action.37
the result) (agreeing with the majority that the Free Exercise Clause “does not give an
individual the right to dictate the Government’s method of recordkeeping”).
29. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
30. Id. at 451; id. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 442 (majority opinion).
32. Id. at 443.
33. Id. at 444.
34. Id. at 450–52.
35. Id. at 452.
36. Id. at 465, 468–69 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. See id. at 450–51 (majority opinion) (“[Sherbert] does not and cannot imply that
incidental effects of government programs, which may make it more difficult to practice
certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce . . . require government to bring
forward a compelling justification . . . .”).
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Two years later in Smith, in a third case involving Native American
religion, the Supreme Court scrapped the Sherbert/Yoder rule for all
future cases except those involving the particular circumstances of the
Sherbert and Yoder litigants.  Smith, a Klamath Native American, who
had asserted a religiously grounded obligation for the use of peyote,
had been fired from his job as a drug and alcohol counselor in Ore-
gon, which precipitated his denied claim for unemployment bene-
fits.38  Justice Scalia wrote an opinion that rejected the compelling
state interest standard.  Justice Scalia did not recognize Yoder as en-
dorsing the principle that the Free Exercise Clause calls upon states to
exempt religious objectors from otherwise valid secular laws unless the
government had a compelling reason for refusing the exemption.39
Rather, claimed Justice Scalia, the Yoder Court permitted an exemp-
tion from school attendance rules because both free exercise and an
additional fundamental right—that of familial privacy—were at
stake.40
38. LOUIS FISHER, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 183 (2002).
39. See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).  The
Court explained the following:
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars applica-
tion of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have
involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in con-
junction with other constitutional protections, such as . . . the right of parents . . .
to direct the education of their children . . . .
Id.
40. Id. But see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–21 (1972) (emphasizing the religi-
osity of the claim, in order to link it to the Free Exercise Clause, and then explicitly for that
reason invoking the compelling interest test).  The Yoder Court explained the following:
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier
to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular consid-
erations; to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be
rooted in religious belief.  Although a determination of what is a “religious” belief
or practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a most delicate ques-
tion, the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make
his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has impor-
tant interests.  Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective
evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the ma-
jority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated himself
at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis.  Thoreau’s
choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief does
not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.
Giving no weight to such secular considerations, however, we see that the
record in this case abundantly supports the claim that the traditional way of life of
the Amish is not merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep relig-
ious conviction, shared by an organized group . . . .
. . . .
The impact of the compulsory-attendance law on respondents’ practice of
the Amish religion is not only severe, but inescapable . . . .
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But Smith also involved a right beyond that of religious exercise.
Indigenous peoples have, at the least, a morally recognizable right to
maintain their own culture and independence.  Religious communi-
ties, who sought to maintain their own religion rather than have an-
other imposed upon them, sought and obtained the constitutional
guarantee of non-establishment and free exercise of religion.  In or-
der to obtain such an agreement, they had to agree not to impose
their religion on other communities.  Immigrants accepted these po-
litical conditions, and descendants of the original compact were ar-
guably bound by their ancestors’ actions.  Native Americans, however,
became part of the United States by coercion rather than by choice—
they were here before the Europeans arrived.  Interfering with their
religious practices, including their cultural integration of religion with
government, could not be justified on exactly the same basis as within
the Euro-American community.
In Worcester v. Georgia,41 Chief Justice Marshall rhetorically asked,
“Did these adventurers, by sailing along the coast; and occasionally
landing on it, acquire for the several governments to whom they be-
longed, or by whom they were commissioned, a rightful property in
the soil, from the Atlantic to the Pacific; or rightful dominion over the
numerous people who occupied it?”42  But the right to be free from
colonial domination has never been recognized constitutionally.  Fur-
ther, Chief Justice Marshall enunciated the theory of discovery in John-
. . . .
. . . A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless of-
fend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly bur-
dens the free exercise of religion . . . .
We turn, then, to the State’s broader contention that its interest in its system
of compulsory education is so compelling that even the established religious prac-
tices of the Amish must give way . . . . [W]e must searchingly examine the interests
that the State seeks to promote by its requirement for compulsory education to
age 16 . . . .
Id.  It is not only shocking that Justice Scalia mischaracterized free exercise precedent, see
Smith, 494 U.S. at 895–97 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (signaling her an-
noyance with the decision to recast Yoder as a “‘hybrid’ decision[ ]” (quoting id. at 892
(majority opinion))), but it is also ironic that he relied on the right of privacy, surely not
his favorite constitutional right, for the compelling interest requirement.  An additional
oddity of the Smith decision is that compelling arguments were available indicating that
prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, the case had been rendered moot by out-of-court
developments. See FISHER, supra note 38, at 186 (detailing changes that called into ques- R
tion Smith’s status as a live controversy).
41. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
42. Id. at 543.
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son v. M’Intosh.43  It meant that non-indigenous people asserted at
least partial dominion within their own justice system over indigenous
peoples.44
The heart of the claim in Lyng was that Native Americans’ loss of
title to land—whether by treaty, force, or other means—did not sur-
render their rights to pursue their religious beliefs and practices with-
out disturbance.45  Justice O’Connor’s opinion suggested that the
Native Americans’ religious claims swept so broadly as to shift from
merely religious claims to claims of cultural autonomy, and that ac-
knowledging constitutional priority for such indigenous claims would
lead to unacceptable results.  Justice O’Connor noted that “such be-
liefs could easily require de facto beneficial ownership of some rather
spacious tracts of public property.”46  In short, adding concern for the
moral right to cultural autonomy of native peoples as the basis for a
compelling interest test would reverse the constitutional marginaliza-
tion of Native American rights and would destabilize the long term
understandings of the non-indigenous majority.
The strength of the Native Americans’ claim to pursue religious
practices was premised more on the history of the nation than on the
religious nature of the claim.  Even if the particular religious practices
were idiosyncratic or grew out of incorporating European religion
into native practices, indigenous culture was at stake in the litigation.
The problem is particularly acute because many indigenous peoples
do not separate government, religion, and culture.  In his dissent, Jus-
tice Brennan wrote the following:
[F]or Native Americans religion is not a discrete sphere of
activity separate from all others, and any attempt to isolate
the religious aspects of Indian life “is in reality an exercise
43. See 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 592 (1823) (“The absolute ultimate title has been con-
sidered as acquired by discovery, subject only to the Indian title of occupancy, which title
the discoverers possessed the exclusive right of acquiring.”).
44. Under Chief Justice Marshall’s theory, discovery gave the right to exclude other
would-be discoverers, such as European sovereigns, but Native Americans retained the
rights associated with occupancy, which included decisions over how to use the occupied
land and control over internal communal government. Id. at 573–74.
45. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988) (noting
that the Native Americans “have used [this area within the National Forest] for a very long
time”).
46. Id. at 453.  A number of Native Americans supported the forest road, id. at 464–65
n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting), perhaps to benefit the economy and to give them access to
the towns, while many non-Native American environmental groups opposed logging in the
national forest, id. at 443 (majority opinion); id. at 463 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Thus,
there was a question of whether a distinct religious interest that should be recognized
above all others was at issue, or whether it could be characterized as an environmental
claim.
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which forces Indian concepts into non-Indian categories.”
Thus, for most Native Americans, “[t]he area of worship can-
not be delineated from social, political, cultur[al] and other
areas o[f] Indian lifestyle.”47
Justice Brennan argued that the religious beliefs of some indigenous
peoples made it particularly important for them to be able to engage
in ceremonies connected with specific sites, and this fact implied that
they had a First Amendment right to a degree of land use control.48
The integration of culture, religion, and government was demon-
strated by the historic effort at destruction of all three through mis-
sion schools.49  Federal support for mission schools raised serious
establishment questions, but the Supreme Court justified payments to
these religious institutions under the theory of indigenous auton-
omy—federal authorities were making payments out of monies set
aside in trust for the Native American nations according to the desires
of those nations.50  However justified, the mission schools delegi-
47. Id. at 459–60 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
48. See id. at 467–68 (“[T]he site-specific nature of their belief system renders it
nontransportable.”).
49. Congress viewed federal payments for mission activity as a part of the broader goal
of bringing Native Americans into the mainstream of Western civilization.  The federal
“civilization fund” lasted until 1873. FISHER, supra note 38, at 147–51.  President Grant R
reinvigorated dormant missionary activity by authorizing appropriations to religious
groups to run Native American schools. Id. at 155.  In the 1880s, tensions between Protes-
tants and Catholics produced controversy over the appropriation of federal funds for “sec-
tarian schools” via contracts with religious missions. Id. at 155–56.  Eventually, this
controversy caused the federal government to forbid the annual appropriation of money
for missionary schools on reservations after 1899. Id. at 156.  Although Congress an-
nounced that it was ceasing such annual appropriations, in fact, religious groups contin-
ued to educate Native Americans on reservations, funding the schools with money they
continued to receive annually from the federal government through terms mandated by
specific treaties and in the form of interest from tribal trust funds (derived from cessions of
tribal land to the federal government). Id. at 156 & n.59.  In 1881, U.S. government policy
ramped up the effort to obliterate traditional Native American religions. Id. at 157.  Rather
than leave matters to missionaries, who may have varied in their kindliness toward such
practices, the administration enacted an official ban on Native American funeral ceremo-
nies and on the Sun Dance. Id. at 57.  This executive regulation was part of a broader
intense assimilation campaign between 1881–1928, which included pressuring Native
Americans into taking individual allotments from tribal land to become farmers and send-
ing Native American children to boarding schools for eight years where they were forced to
dress and speak as Anglo-Americans and to abandon vestiges of their religion. VINE DELO-
RIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 8–12 (1983); FISHER,
supra note 38, at 157–59. R
50. Quick Bear, a Native American, challenged the funding system as a violation of the
congressional ban on future appropriations for “sectarian schools” for Native Americans
and as violating “the spirit” of the Establishment Clause. Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50,
81 (1908).  The Government successfully argued that it did not violate the statutory ban
because the money belonged to each tribe (in trust) to expend as it chose. Id. at 80–81.
The Supreme Court also accepted the argument that the application of Native American
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timized old ways of doing things and thus weakened indigenous cul-
ture.  The United States government was targeting indigenous
language, religion, and traditional understandings and rules as obsta-
cles to “civilization” and intentionally undermining them.
The history of the treatment of Native Americans demonstrates
how religion was enmeshed in their culture and highlights the anom-
aly of using different standards for their protection.  The standard
used by the Supreme Court to protect culture has been derived from
free speech cases rather than from free exercise cases, and the Su-
preme Court seemed to recognize that the two clauses of the First
Amendment should be on par, even though in Smith it abandoned the
“compelling interest” test for free exercise cases.  Government acts di-
rected at destroying religion or culture violate the First Amendment,
but the Supreme Court will uphold as constitutional any acts that have
an incidental effect on the exercise of either religion or culture if they
are closely tailored to furthering any substantial government
interest.51
III. POLITICS
The Smith Court’s rejection of decades of First Amendment law
prompted Congress to enact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993 (“RFRA”),52 which effectively restored to all Americans the
pro-free-exercise posture enshrined in the tone of the American In-
dian Religious Freedom Act of 1978.53  RFRA provided that in in-
stances where a generally applicable law “substantially burden[s]”
religious exercise, state and federal government must grant a waiver
from the law unless the government has a “compelling governmental
interest” in refusing to do so and the legal requirement is the “least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest.”54  The Su-
preme Court, with all the Yoder Justices having been replaced, subse-
quently struck down the portion of RFRA that applied to state
trust funds to sectarian schools not only did not violate the Establishment Clause, but it was
required in order to honor the Free Exercise Clause rights of the Native Americans. Id. at
82.
51. See Bogen, supra note 5, at 204–05 (arguing that the O’Brien test is appropriate for R
both religion and speech clauses where a generally applicable law is challenged).
52. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4
(2006)), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006).
54. Id. § 2000bb-1(b), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997).
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government in City of Boerne v. Flores.55  Congress followed up by enact-
ing the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000.56  This law reenacted the RFRA rules for state governments but
limited them to two kinds of situations: (1) those involving land-use
issues that would affect commerce among the states because of the use
of construction or remodeling materials; and (2) those involving per-
sons confined in state institutions—such as prisons or hospitals—that
received federal funds.57
The result of these events has been to move the protection of
religious exercise from the constitutional realm to that of the political.
Protecting religious exercise by granting religious believers rights de-
nied to others raises establishment issues.  The Establishment Clause
forbids government from enacting a law respecting an establishment
of religion.  It protects minority religions by creating a barrier to pre-
ferring one religion over others or even over irreligion.  The demo-
cratic electoral process ensures that the dominant political culture will
be established and will enact laws pursuant to its vision.  Free speech
protects dissenting voices, but it does not protect them from laws con-
trary to their views.  The Establishment Clause, however, does protect
religion from having contrary religions established.  Thus, in this con-
text, religion receives a particular protection because it is assumed to
be separated from the governmental process.
Although Smith permits government to apply generally applicable
laws to religious exercise, it does not forbid government from exempt-
ing religious exercise from such laws.58  Exemptions have been chal-
lenged as establishing religion because religious believers receive a
privilege denied to persons who seek exemption from laws for other
reasons.  The Supreme Court has found that religious exemptions
may be justified by concern for the Free Exercise Clause.59  Neverthe-
55. 521 U.S. at 511.  It left standing the RFRA’s application to federal laws. See Gonza-
les v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436–37 (2006) (apply-
ing RFRA to require exemption from the Controlled Substances Act for the ritual use of
hoasca).  Also, because it was struck down essentially on Tenth Amendment grounds, the
ruling presumably left standing both the 1978 Indian Religious Freedom Act and the appli-
cability of RFRA to Native American religious practice, since Congress has particular con-
stitutional power to deal with Native Americans. See infra Part IV; United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375 (1886).
56. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5
(2006)).
57. Id.
58. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
59. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722–24 (2005) (unanimously holding that the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 does not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause where it required prisons to show a compelling governmental interest for
imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise of confined persons).
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less, any such exemption must apply to all religions or the Establish-
ment Clause objection would succeed.60  Although establishment
doctrine prohibits distinctions based on religion, it does not forbid
distinctions based on tribal membership with respect to religious ex-
emptions.  Thus, Native Americans often fare better than other cul-
tures or religions.
IV. THE INDIGENOUS EXCEPTION
The blend of culture and religion in Native American cases led
the Supreme Court to apply a single constitutional standard for all
cases concerning religious and cultural freedom.  The Supreme Court
has treated Native American religions and nonindigenous religions
alike for purposes of the application of the Free Speech and Free Ex-
ercise Clauses; however, the Constitution treats them differently with
respect to political protections offered by Congress.
Beginning in the 1960s, the government began to specifically pro-
tect Native American religious and cultural interests.  The first steps
were small.  In 1962, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior
to issue regulations protecting the Native Americans’ possession and
use of eagles for religious purposes,61 and in 1963, the Secretary of the
Interior issued such a regulation for Native Americans engaged in “au-
thentic, bona fide” use of eagles for their religion.62  Subsequently, in
1968, Congress issued the Indian Civil Rights Act,63 which essentially
listed the Bill of Rights from the United States Constitution and ap-
plied them to protect Native Americans with respect to tribal govern-
ments.  The Indian Civil Rights Act pointedly omits the prohibition on
laws “respecting an establishment of religion,” but does specify that
tribal governments may not “make or enforce any law prohibiting the
free exercise of religion . . . .”64
60. Id. at 720 (citing Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687
(1994)).
61. Pub. L. No. 87-884, 76 Stat. 1246 (1962) (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior
to promulgate regulations for the preservation of the golden eagle); FISHER, supra note 38, R
at 163.
62. Possession and Use for Religious Purposes, 28 Fed. Reg. 23,975, 23,976 (Feb. 1,
1963); FISHER, supra note 38, at 164. R
63. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, 82 Stat. 77 (1968) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1301–1303 (2006)).
64. Id.; FISHER, supra note 38, at 165.  In 1970, Congress again supported Native Ameri- R
can religious rights by ceding back to the Pueblo Indians 48,000 acres of land around Blue
Lake near Taos, New Mexico, that a presidential order had taken from them in 1906.  Pub.
L. No. 91-550, 84 Stat. 1437 (1970); FISHER, supra note 38, at 167–68.  These Native Ameri- R
cans viewed this as sacred land. Id. at 167.
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This piece of the Indian Civil Rights Act plainly proceeded on the
understanding that for reservation Native Americans, because their re-
ligion was tribal, the individual’s right of free exercise implicated a
right to have his tribe establish a religion.  In light of their history with
the federal government, a national coalition of Native American
groups wanted a further guarantee and lobbied beginning in 1967 for
specific federal support for Native American religious traditions.65
Those lobbying efforts bore fruit in the joint resolution of Congress,
which resulted in the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
(“AIRFA”) of 1978.66  Recognizing that freedom of religion in
America has produced “a rich variety of religious heritages,”67 AIRFA
states the following:
[I]t shall be the policy of the United States to protect and
preserve for American Indians their inherent right of free-
dom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional reli-
gions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native
Hawaiians, including but not limited to access to sites, use
and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship
through ceremonials and traditional rites.68
Nonetheless, in the words of Justice O’Connor, AIRFA did not “so
much as . . . hint of any intent to create a cause of action or any
judicially enforceable individual rights.”69
In the wake of RFRA, Congress passed the American Indian Re-
ligious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994.70  The new statute was nar-
rowly directed at protecting the Native American church in its
ceremonial use of peyote.  It noted that federal drug laws and those of
65. Suzan Shown Harjo, American Indian Religious Freedom Act After Twenty-Five Years, WI-
CAZO SA REVIEW, Fall 2004, at 129, 130.
66. Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1996
(2006)).
67. Id.
68. Id.  Section Two of the resolution orders the President to direct federal agencies to
re-evaluate their policies and procedures, in consultation with the religious leaders of Na-
tive Americans, in order to determine changes necessary for “protect[ing] and
preserv[ing] Native American religious cultural rights and practices” and to “report back
to the Congress the results of [their] evaluation, including any changes which were made
in administrative policies . . . and any recommendations [they] may have for legislative
action.” Id.; see also FISHER, supra note 38, at 168–69 (discussing generally the review pro- R
cess under AIRFA); Harjo, supra note 65, at 131 (same).  The Carter Administration did R
this in August 1979 after a review in which more than fifty federal agencies participated.
Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988); Harjo, supra note
65, at 131. R
69. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 455.
70. Pub. L. No. 103-344, 108 Stat. 3125 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1996a (2006)).
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a majority of states had exempted the religious use of peyote and pro-
hibited other states from proscribing it.71  The statute provided that
the ceremonial use of peyote by Native Americans is lawful and may
not be made illegal by any state or the United States government.72
The new statute had several constitutional bases that did not ap-
ply to RFRA—the general federal power with respect to Native Ameri-
can tribes from United States v. Kagama,73 and the Fourteenth
Amendment Section 574 power to enforce the proscription against ra-
cial discrimination.  Thus, if the classification is regarded as racial, the
law is justified as a means of preventing racial discrimination;75 if it is
71. Id.  The law provided the following:
The Congress finds and declares that:
(1) for many Indian people, the traditional ceremonial use of the peyote cactus as
a religious sacrament has for centuries been integral to a way of life, and signifi-
cant in perpetuating Indian tribes and cultures;
(2) since 1965, this ceremonial use of peyote by Indians has been protected by
Federal regulation;
(3) while at least 28 States have enacted laws which are similar to, or are in con-
formance with, the Federal regulation which protects the ceremonial use of pe-
yote by Indian religious practitioners, 22 States have not done so, and this lack of
uniformity has created hardship for Indian people who participate in such relig-
ious ceremonies;
(4) the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Employment Division
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), held that the First Amendment does not protect
Indian practitioners who use peyote in Indian religious ceremonies, and also
raised uncertainty whether this religious practice would be protected under the
compelling State interest standard; and
(5) the lack of adequate and clear legal protection for the religious use of peyote
by Indians may serve to stigmatize and marginalize Indian tribes and cultures,
and increase the risk that they will be exposed to discriminatory treatment.
Id.
72. Id.  The statute declared the following:
(b)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession, or trans-
portation of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in
connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall
not be prohibited by the United States or any State.  No Indian shall be penalized
or discriminated against on the basis of such use, possession or transportation,
including, but not limited to, denial of otherwise applicable benefits under public
assistance programs.
Id.
73. 118 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1886).
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
75. One might wonder how this law is anti-discrimination, since it protects only tribal
member Native Americans in the sacramental use of this drug.  One answer might be that
Congress presumed that such use by others is typically not a bona fide religious practice,
that to refuse to create a sacramental use exemption for peyote, when such exemption is
typically provided for sacramental use of wine in “dry jurisdictions,” shows a prior practice
of racially linked discrimination.  To be a Native American is to belong to a racial, cultural,
and political group (with perhaps different but overlapping membership).  Discrimination
against Native Americans violates equal protection, and arguably the failure to exempt the
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political, the law is justified as part of the United States government’s
power over its “ward.”  At the same time, the law would not even affect
all the parties to the Smith case.  Galen Black was not a Native Ameri-
can.76  Thus, the current state of the law has more regard for the relig-
ious exercise of Native Americans than for others.
Although some have argued that Native Americans should not
have greater rights to religious or cultural protection than other peo-
ple,77 the history and constitutional position of America’s indigenous
peoples justifies such rights.78  Political exceptionalism for indigenous
religion is neither establishment nor forbidden by equal protection
when it is structured on the basis of indigeneity.  The reason for af-
fording special protection to indigenous traditional rites was rooted in
a disapproval of imposing outside norms on a group entitled by their
original occupation of the land to respect and autonomy—that is, re-
spect for cultural autonomy rather than religion—although specific
rules were often articulated in religious terms.
The Constitution applies to federal and state governments, but it
does not apply to Native American nations.  Such nations form, in
Justice John Marshall’s words, “domestic dependent nations.”79
Tribes have lawmaking authority over reservation lands that may be
enforced through tribal courts80 and are not subject to state law over
Native Americans on that land.81  Although tribal laws are not subject
to the constitutional commands of free exercise and non-establish-
drug or even the proscription of the drug might be racially based—government may have
initially proscribed the drug because it is associated with an unpopular racial group.  The
remedy, however, may proceed one step at a time and include only members of tribes (a
politically determined identity rather than simply a racial identity) because administra-
tively, it is a more workable rule.  States, however, remain free to offer religious peyote
exemptions to non-Native Americans.
76. FISHER, supra note 38, at 184. R
77. See, e.g., David Garrett, Note, Vine of the Dead: Reviving Equal Protection Rites for Relig-
ious Drug Use, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 143, 162 (2007) (concluding that allowing religious
drug use based on the government’s special relationship with Native American tribes cre-
ates a virtually impossible standard for other groups trying to establish exceptions for their
own religious drug use).
78. See Kevin J. Worthen, Eagle Feathers and Equality: Lessons on Religious Exceptions from
the Native American Experience, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 989, 1003–09 (2005) (discussing various
historical and cultural reasons that Native Americans are differently situated from non-
Native Americans, thus justifying differential treatment in the American constitutional
system).
79. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
80. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978) (“Tribal courts have
repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of dis-
putes affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indi-
ans.”) (internal citations omitted).
81. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
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ment, they are subject to federal laws that override.  The degree of
autonomy permitted by the federal government is hotly contested, but
the decisions are largely political rather than constitutional ones.
The quasi-sovereign status of the Native American tribe has been
recognized in several ways.  In the Constitution, Congress has been
given power to “regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.”82
Further, congressional regulatory power has been based on the notion
that “Indian tribes are the wards of the nation.”83  But the tribe also
exerts sovereignty over its land, and that excludes the regulatory
power of the state within which it exists.84  The Supreme Court also
recognized the sovereign immunity of Native American tribes to pre-
clude suit in federal court by one of the members.85  And membership
in a tribe suffices to distinguish Native Americans from other citizens
for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.  Thus, the Supreme
Court upheld a preference for tribal members in employment with
the Bureau of Indian Affairs on the ground that the preference was
not a racial classification but applied to them “as members of quasi-
sovereign tribal entities . . . .”86
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
83. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886).
84. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.  There are complicated caveats to such a bold
general statement, but they do not undermine the general proposition that Native Ameri-
can nations are a unique political entity under our Constitution and laws.  For example,
after World War II, the pendulum in Native American policy swung again toward assimila-
tionist policies.  Congress launched an effort to terminate the status of Native American
tribes to eliminate federal supervision of their activities.  H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 67
Stat. B132 (1953).  Ultimately, about 109 tribes and bands were terminated, affecting about
three percent of all federally recognized Native Americans and Native American trust land.
Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 139, 151 (1977).  Most of the affected tribes were small and would have real difficulty
in maintaining much of a governmental structure, but the impact of termination was a loss
of services and some rights. Id. at 153–54.
In connection with these policies of selectively getting out of supervision, Congress
enacted Public Law 280 in 1953, which imposed state jurisdiction on specified areas and
allowed states to take jurisdiction.  Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588; see also Carole
E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA
L. REV. 535, 537–38 (1975).  The remnants of that statute are in 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006),
which imposes state jurisdiction to extend state criminal laws and supplant the federal
jurisdiction that previously existed in limited situations.
85. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 51, 58, 70–72 (holding that where a tribal mem-
ber sued to enjoin enforcement of a tribal ordinance as a gender-based violation of the
Indian Civil Rights Act, the tribe had sovereign immunity just as though it were a separate
nation, that the immunity applied because there was nothing in the Indian Civil Rights Act
of 1968 that expressly waived it, and that no cause of action should be implied even against
the officials of the tribe who would not personally have such immunity).
86. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974).
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Membership in a tribe may not be sufficient to justify all distinc-
tions and preferences for Native Americans, but the promotion of tri-
bal autonomy from federal as well as state law has become a
cornerstone of federal policy, as was seen in Lyng.  The dimensions of
that autonomy remain in constant flux because the Supreme Court
recognizes the ultimate regulatory power of the federal government,
but the history of America supports the legitimacy of the federal inter-
est in preserving the cultural and religious autonomy of the indige-
nous peoples distinct from the interests of any other group—because
no other group was recognized as sovereign in dealings in the past nor
maintains such quasi-sovereign status today.
V. CONCLUSION
The collision of indigenous interests and the religion clause of
the Constitution has produced some paradoxical results.  The distinc-
tive nature of religion as a part of Native American culture seems to
have influenced the Supreme Court to cabin the constitutional limits
on government power that are specifically protective of religion.  It
led the Court to apply the same constitutional standards for applica-
ble laws that impair religious exercise as it uses to judge such laws that
incidentally affect speech.  The unique nature of the Native American
experience eventually led to a common constitutional standard for
the Free Exercise Clause applicable to all peoples in the United States.
That standard ultimately placed responsibility in the political process
for the protection of religion and communication from incidental in-
terference.  Here the history of indigenous peoples, who retain a de-
gree of sovereignty and autonomy unique among the peoples of the
United States, justifies the government’s political choices to grant
them rights that no other group can claim.
